Summit Outcome Document, which was formally adopted by the General Assembly in Resolution 60/1 (2005) . 19 In paragraphs 138-140 of the World Summit Outcome Document, heads of government and the General Assembly affirm the "responsibility to protect . . . populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity."
20 The text of those paragraphs provides the operative basis for the Responsibility to Protect:
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping
States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out. The second sentence of the paragraph goes on to discuss more active forms of collective action:
n this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-bycase basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity." 40 This sentence expressly recognizes that atrocities occur not just where states are unable to protect their populations, but also where they are unwilling to do so. Left unstated is the reality that it isn't always about a failure of protection but that states sometimes are actively responsible for the commission of these crimes.
While the sentence has strong rhetorical power, boldly stating that the international community is prepared to act where national authorities fail to do so, its legal significance is limited. Rather than seeking to create an affirmative duty for international intervention, the sentence articulates a political reality-the preparedness to act-that may or may not actually be true in any particular case. Note, for example, the difference in language between the recognition of an affirmative "responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means" and the should strengthen individual criminal responsibility. 57 Regarding international assistance and capacity-building, the report highlights the need to make states aware of the costs of the perpetration of international crimes and the need for region-to-region learning processes particularly 50 The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, UN Doc. A/63/677, Jan. 12, 2009. 51 Id., at 5. 52 Id. 53 Id., at 8. 54 Id., at 9. 55 Id. 56 Id., at 11. 57 Id., at 12-13.
suggests the need for assistance programs "to build specific capacities within societies that would make them less likely to travel the path to crimes relating to the responsibility to protect." The release of the Secretary-General's Report's gave rise to a lengthy debate in the General Assembly about the Responsibility to Protect and whether the report itself should be adopted in some way by the General Assembly. Those debates got off to a rather unfavorable start. The president of the General Assembly, Father Miguel d'Escoto Brockmann of Nicaragua, released a concept note to frame the discussion that was deeply critical of the Responsibility to Protect and sought to reopen a more general discussion as to its validity and appropriateness. 63 Delegates from Cuba, Nicaragua, Sudan, and Venezuela explicitly called for a reopening of general debate. Yet, 58 Id., at 16-17. 59 Id., at 20. 60 Id., at 22. 61 Id., at 25. 62 Id., at 27. The most recent developments in the Responsibility to Protect were the release on a follow-on report by the Secretary-General in July 2010 and a subsequent General Assembly dialogue. The report, entitled "Early warning, assessment, and the responsibility to protect" further seeks to operationalize RtoP and focuses on the mechanisms available to provide early warning and prevent, rather than merely respond to, atrocity. The report recognizes gaps in the United Nation's early warning capabilities and notes significant improvements in information-sharing over the past decade. It calls upon United Nations entities to improve "the flow of information from the field to headquarters" and analytic assessment tools. 68 While information flow, assessment, and early warning are essential, operationalization of the Responsibility to Protect is more often a political than informational challenge. Without addressing the problem of political will head-on, the report does seek to foster mechanisms to link early warning to preventive action. It calls upon the Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide and the Special Advisor on the Responsibility to Protect to "to convene an urgent meeting of key Under-Secretaries-General to identify a range of multilateral policy options, whether by the United Nations or by Chapter VIII regional arrangements, for preventing such mass crimes and for protecting populations." 69 While such a meeting will not necessarily lead to the action that is needed, it is an important step to facilitating connection between early warning and prevention.
One month after the release of the follow-on report, the president of the General Assembly convened an informal, interactive dialogue on early warning and assessment. Contributions from 42 member states again stressed the importance of prevention and the need for early warming mechanisms within the UN system. 70 While a few states expressed concern about the ongoing development of RtoP, the overall focus of the discussion remained on concrete steps to advance its implementation, including the creation of a joint office for the Secretary-General's Special Advisors on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect. Ultimately, the dialogue should be viewed as a further recognition of a deepening consensus on both the need for and substance of the Responsibility to Protect, but a consensus still marked by lingering concerns about the ways in which RtoP may be implemented.
VI. Conclusion
The Responsibility to Protect has developed with extraordinary speed. The ICISS Report was released just a decade ago. Since then, the concept has been advanced, framed in terms of concrete implementation steps by the Secretary-General, endorsed twice by the General Assembly, and reaffirmed by the Security Council. In a world of international politics, where change is slow and international legal codification even slower, this rapid trajectory from idea to norm is remarkable. It reflects an expanding view that far more must be done to prevent atrocities and stop international Finally, the processes of the past ten years suggest a strong and growing consensus around the Responsibility to Protect. Yet, as is often the case in international law and politics, when states are asked to transform norm to law, political considerations get in the way. Moving too fast risks undermining that consensus as some states step back from forward-leaning rhetorical positions to avoid legal codification.
Ultimately, the power of any norm or rule of international law is its ability to alter the costbenefit calculations, preference sets, or value choices of actors in the international system. The
Responsibility to Protect has already done so and will continue to do so. As the chapters that follow demonstrate, the norm has already shifted academic and political debates; altered conceptions of sovereignty; changed the way states and international actors talk about international crimes and their prevention; and shifted discussions on the appropriateness and duties of intervention. Because of the emergence of the Responsibility to Protect over the past decade, it is today more costly-in terms of political capital, international sanction, and moral identity-for states to perpetrate international atrocities or to allow them to unfold unhindered. And it is more difficult for the international community to stand by-as it did all too often in the past-when atrocity is perpetrated.
The further codification of the Responsibility to Protect as binding international law would, undoubtedly, increase the costs on states that perpetrate international crimes or allow them to occur.
Framing the norm as law would facilitate greater condemnations of violations and might give rise to new sanctions for violation. Yet as history all too clearly shows, even international law is not inviolable and the legal codification of the Responsibility to Protect would offer no guarantees of human security.
Ultimately, timing is everything. The desire to legalize the Responsibility to Protect must be balanced against its further substantive development and expanding political consensus of support.
For the time being, a course of patient prudence significantly outweighs the marginal increase in effectiveness of formal legalization. And there is reason for optimism that the Responsibility to Protect will develop over time in ways that make it more precise, more expansive, and more effective. While that development unfolds, the norm itself will continue, as it already has, to shape and impact the behavior of states and the cause of human security.
